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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

FRED WALKER,

Plaintiff and ReS"[Jondent,
VB.

Case No. 8224

C. C. BINTZ and SHAW, INC., a
corporation of the State of Utah,

Defendarnts OJnd Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NAT'URE OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by the Plaintiff in two
counts, one for money had and received, and the other
for breach of contract, and seeking as damages the
recovery of $1,000.00 earnest money deposit, interest,
attorney's fees and costs.
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FACTS
In 1953, the Defendant, C. C. Bintz, was the owner
and in possession of a certain parcel of unimproved real
estate situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, commonly designated as 5850 Highland Drive, which property
had been listed for sale by the owner with Shaw, Inc.,
a real estate brokerage firm of which Manford A. Shaw
was President and one l\1. G. Brixen was an employee.
On May 11, 1953, tJ:!e Defendant Shaw, Inc., found Fred
Walker as a prospective ':Purchaser of the property and
on said date had him execute an "Earnest Money Receipt
i~d Offer to Purchase" agreement; (Exhibit I). Concurrent with the execution of-the agreement by the Plain~
tiff, the sum of $1,000.00 was paid over to the Defendant,
Shaw, Inc.
The Earnest Money Receipt contains the following
provisions :
"The total purchase price of $30,250.00 shall
be payable as follows: $1,000.00 which represents
the aforesaid deposit, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged by you; $------------------------ when seller
approves sale ; $4,000.00 on delivery of deed or
final contract of sale which shall be on or before
July 11, 1953, and $500.00 each month commencing
or more (sic) com1nencing August 11, 1953. Balance in fu1l on or before J'uly 11, 1956, until t~e
balance of $25,250.00 together with interest IS
paid; provided, however, that the buyer at his
option, at any ti1ne, may pay amounts in excess
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of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance,
subject to the limitations of any mortgage or contract by the buyer herein assumed. Interest at
5% per annum on the unpaid portions of the
purchase price to be included in the prescribed
payments and shall begin as of date of possession
which shall be on or before when ·aeal is finally
closed.'' (Emphasis Ours)
The Earnest Money Agreement further provides as
follows:
"We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill
the terms and conditions specified above, and the
seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title
with abstract to date or at Seller's option a policy
of title insurance in the name of the purchaser
and to make final conveyance by warranty deed
or ·······················-·····-····································-··············· ;"
On or about June 24, 1953, the Appellants delivered
an abstract of title to Respondent's Attorney for examination (R. 116). An opinion was rendered thereon
which noted various exceptions to the title which were
objectionable to the Respondent, Walker. The Appellant,
Shaw, Inc., assured Walker thttt the title was not defective; that the title had been passed upon by competent
counsel of their own (R. 29); that they would furnish
Respondent a policy of title insurance in support thereof,
(R. 117).
The Defendant secured an Interim Binder of Title
Insurance from the Utah Savings & Trust Abstract
Company (Exhibit 3) on or about July 9, 1953, and sub-
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mitted same to Respondent as evidence of title and thereupon demanded that he execute a Uniform Real Estate
Contract prepared by Shaw, Inc., and which had already
been executed by the Appellant Bintz, (Exhibit 9).
The Respondent then informed Appellants that in
view of the exceptions contained in the Interim Binder
of Title Insurance supplied by them, (Exhibit 3) he did
not consider the title to the property safe to purchase
and demanded a return of his earnest money deposit,

(R. 32).
Defendants never supplied any further evidence of
title nor did they convey any further information to the
Plaintiff that any. further steps had or would be taken
to satisfy his demand for evidence of "clear title," but
insisted that he pay $4,000.00 and execute the Uniform
Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9) on July 11, 1953, (R.

108).
Not only had the Appellants failed ~ notify the
R,espondent of any intention to correct the flaws in the
title, as disclosed hy an examination of the abstract and
the interim binder of title insurance, but in fact they
pleaded in their answer to the complaint that title was
not defective, (R. 17) and even as late as April 24, 1954,
the date on which the trial court heard this action Appellants were still unwilling to admit a defective title,
(R. 17), as an examination of the bulk of the proceedings
will disclose. It was not until the filing of this appeal that
the Appellants abandoned their theory that the title was
not defective.
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The Respondent instituted action against the Appellants and C. C. Bintz counterclaimed, alleging that he
was able to perform the conditions of the Earnest Money
Receipt and further alleged the provisions for retention
of down payment as a forfeiture of liquidated damages;
and also alleged damages to 'his property, (R. 9-12).
The trial court found as a matter of fact that the
Appellant, C. C. Bintz, had failed to furnish evidence of
marketable title, and further found as a matter of fact
that the Appellants had never furnished_Respondent with
anyevidenee of their intention to clear the title, (Findings
ofFaet)
Judgment was entered in favor of-Respondent on his
second count, and reeovery denied upon the Counterelaim
of the Appellant Bintz, from which judgment this appeal
is taken.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HOLD THAT THE
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT WAS NOT A COMPLETE
CONTRACT.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE SELLER MUST FURNISH MARKETABLE
TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT SHAW.
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POINT

IV~

'THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING RECOVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTERCLAIM.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HOLD THAT THE
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT WAS NOT A COMPLETE
CONTRACT.

-It is the Appellants' contention in this case that the
lower court held that the Earnest Money .Receipt signed
by Walker and Bintz was not a complete contract. We
can find no indication of such a position having been
taken by the district court. The court did .not hold,
however, that' the Earnest Money Receipt was the same
agreement as the Uniform Real Estate Agreement which
was contemplated as a result of said Earnest Money
Receipt Agreement.. It will be seen that the Earnest
Money Receipt Agreement requires the following:
''That the Seller furnish go"Odand marketable
title 'vith ·Abstract to date or at Seller's option a
Policy of Title Insurance in the name of the Purchaser and to make final conveyance by Warranty
Deed.'' (Exhibit I)
In the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9)
contemplated as the final agreement by the parties, it
states with regards to· the title as follows:
"The Seller upon receiving payments herem
reserved to be paid at the times and in the manner
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above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to
the Buyer or Assigns a good and sufficient Warranty Deed conveying the title to the above described premises, free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as
may have accrued by or through the acts or neglect
of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense an
Abstract of Title. or Policy of Title Insurance, at
the option of the. Seller, brought up to date at the
time of the sale or at the time of delivery of deed,
at the option of the Buyer."
It will be seen by an examination of these two instruments that while the general terms as to payment
may be the same, the terms with regard to when evidence
of titre is to be furnished are different. The Uniform
Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9) gives the Seller the
option to. furnish marketable title either at the time of
the sale or upon delivery of the deed after payment is
made. The Earnest Money Receipt Agreement states. that
the Seller is to furnish marketable title or title insurance:
to date and we are unable to lend any credence to Appellants' contention that "to date'' does not mean ''to date''
at all but four years later; and when the function of the
earnest Money Receipt is construed in the context of the
parties negotiations, it is apparent that the Earnest
Money Receipt Agreement is often made before the
Buyer has had time to examine the title and the assumption is that he will have such time before the final Uniform Real Estate Contract is made.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE

SELLER MUST FURNISH MARKETABLE

TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953.

The Appellants contend that the term ''to date" is
ambiguous and misleading because there are several
dates involved in the Agreement Quoting from Page 10
of Defendants' Brief, "On July 11, 1953, the additional
$4,000.00 was to ·be paid." An examination of the actual
context of the Earnest Money Receipt Agreement reveals
that the select!on of this date by the trial Judge was not
so capricious. Quoting from the Earnest Money Receipt
Agreement, (Exhibit I), "4,000.00 on delivery of deed
or final contract of sale which shall be· on or before JUly
11, 1953." In other words, this date represented the date
upon which the final sale was to be consumated.
We are quite inti'iguted by the Appellants' curious
interpretation of the term "to date" which, as we have
previously indicated,- according to them, does not mean
"to date" at all, but means four years later. This interpretation did not apparently occur to them until this appeal
because they did furnish an abstract of title soon after
the Earnest Money Receipt Agreement was made w:hich
was a strange thing to do if their duty to do so did not
arise until four years later. Apparently from their
present interpretation of the contract, furnishing the
abstract of title was for purposes of information only.
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In the case of Woodard vs. Allen, 1 U t 2nd 221, 265
Pac 2nd 398; cited by Appellants, the case involved an
agreement, apparently a Uniform Real Estate Contract,
where the Plaintiff agreed to convey by Warranty Deed
when the payment was received.
Needless to say, the agreement concerning the title
are greatly different in the Earnest Money Receipt
Agreement and the Uniform Real Estate Contract which
difference was pointed out under Point No. 1.
Appellants also argue under Point B of their brief
that if marketable title was required to ·he furnished on
July 11, 1953, the Seller was entitled to a reasonable time
tliereafter to perfect his title. We cannot agree· with this
contention .. It should be recalled that after the objections
to the abstract were raised and called to their attention,
they belatedly submitted an interim binder of title insurance (Exhibit 3) listing numerous exceptions which
we1·e previously pointed out to them.
Actually, they had exercised their option to select
between an abstract of title or title insurance by submitting the abstract of title to the Plaintiff and Respondent.
It is a general rule in this country that where a
contract calls for the Vendor to furnish an abstract of
title showing marketable title, the abstract itself must
show that the Vendor is the owner of record. In 55 Am.
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10
Jur. 734; Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 297, it is stated:
"Under a contract which imposes upon the
Vend or the duty of furnishing an abstract showing
good title in himself, the burden is upon the
Vendor to show by abstract that the title to the
property is in accordance with his covenants. If
the contract calls for an abstract showing a good
title or a Inarketable title in the Vendor, nothing
less than an abstract of this character will satisfy
the condition no matter what the Vendor's real
title may be. Where the Vendor agrees to furnish
an abstract of title it has been held the abstract ·
must on its face or by reference show a good title.''
In Hami).ton vs. Binger, 162 Kansas 415, 176 Pac.
2nd 552, at page 558 it is held:
- "In our consideration of this subject we
proceed upon the premise that where a contract
for sale and purchase of land provides a Vendor
shall furnish the Vendee with an Abstract showing
marketable title, the Abstract must show on its
face a good title in the Vendor, (55 Am. Jur. 734;
Sec. 297, Thompson on Abstracts and Titles 14,
Sec. 9) and the showing of such a title in the Abstract is a condition precedent to be performed
by the Vendor before he will be permitted to
recover any balance claimed by him to be due on
a contract for the sale of real estate, (66 C. J.
957, 'Sec. 644; Thompson on Abstracts and Titles,
12, Sec. 8; Patton on Title, 119, Sec. 25) ."
See also 7 A. L. R. 1166 et seq., and 52 A. L. R. 1460
et seq.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
·•:· ·The proceedings in the lower court concerning the
marketability of title reveal that· the abstract· did not
,show on its face or by reference that there was. a good
title in the Vendor, and under the rule enunciated above
-~he Vendee .is not requir~d to accept any proceedings
'outsid.e the record to make the title good even if that
proceeding does so, ·7 .A. L. R. 1168. Therefore, how can
Appellants argue that they were entitled to a reasonable
time after the above indicated date to correct the defects
where such corrections would have had to be. outside
the record and in violation of .this rple.
However, even if .Appellants were· entitled to a
reasonable time after the defects were .·pointed out to
them to correct the defects by proceedings outside the
record, they had forfeited that right.
After the defects were pointed out to .Appellants,
they did nothing to correct the situat~on except to tender
an interim binder of title insurance which listed numerous
exceptions destroying the marketability of title, (Exhibit
3), which included many of the exceptions listed by
Re.spondent's counseL
Competent testimony at the trial indicated
title was not insurable '(R. 22-42).

.~hat

the

The .Appellants have never conceded, even to this
date, that the title was unmarketable although they have
"assumed for the purpose of this appeal" (.Appellants
Brief) that it was and is unmarketable.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
E'\l'en if they were entitled to a reasonable time after
notification to correct the defects noted, can they ·stand
back and deny that at all times the title is unmarketable
forcing the Vendee to bring them ·to trial on the issue
and when the title is found unmarketable, then say they
are entitled to additional time to correct itY This is a
situation 'where the Vendor of necessity would have to
make an election as t(} his the0:ry. Either he would have
to admit that the title was defective and indicate a willingness to correct it or to stand solely on the theory that
the title was marketable. Otherwise, it would allow the
Vendor to speculate on the outcome of the trial on the
title's marketability at the expense of the Vendee. In 55
Am. JUr. 722, Sec 272, it is stated:
"Moreover, it seems to be the general rule
where time is not of the essence of the contract,
the Vendor has a reasona:ble time after defects are
pointed out to remedy them. If d,efects in the title
are poilnted out by the V erulee OJrl)(], the Vendor
submits the evidence of title without having cor~ected such defects, he is not entitled to additioool
time for this purpose." (57 A. L. R. 15-18)
(E·mphasis 'Ours).
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT SHAW, INC.

The Appellants argue that Judgment should not have
been rendered against the Defendant Shaw, Inc., because
he was an agent and not a party to the contract. The
exact legal relationship of a real estate agent with regard
to his duties to the Buyer and Seller has never been too
carefully delineated. Whether he is the agent of the
Seller or the agent of both the Buyer and Seller is a
question that the courts are in conflict on. In any event,
it should be recalled that the $1,000.00 earnest money was
delivered to him personally and only fifty per cent of
such sum was paid over to Appellant C. C. Bintz and fifty
per cent of said sum was retained by Appellant Shaw,
Inc., (R. 133).
In 2 Am. Jur. 2G4, Agency, Sec 335, it is stated:
"An ~gent to whom money has been paid for his
principal through error or under circumstances
existing at the time of payment that would entitle
the payor to recover it back from the principal, the
principal is immediately liable to the payor for the
money so received so long as it remains in his
hands and there has been no alteration in the
situation of agent toward principal in relationship
to such payment," and in Sec. 340, page 286,
supra it is stated: However, it is to be noted that
where a part payrnent has been made to Vendor's
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agent and is still in his. hands the purchasers may
recover it from the agent if the circumstances are
such that he would be entitled to receive it from
the principal," citing 134 Am. State Rep. 582; 1
105 Me. 471, 75 A. 43.
:~~
l

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING RECOVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTER-CLAIM.

The Respondent cannot agree with the contention
that he breached the contract. On the contrary, from the
facts developed in the case, it appears conclusive that the
contract was breached when the Appellants failed to
supply evidence of marketable title as required by the
terms of the Earnest Money Agreement and in further
failing to indicate that the title could or would be corrected.
A review of the testimony will show that Walker
did not repudiate the contract until after he had afforded
the Appellant the additional opportunity of furnishing
evidence of marketable title in the form of title insurance,
and it was only after an interim binder of title insurance
was tendered setting forth numerous exceptions to the
condition of the title (Exhibit 3) that Walker was compeled· to seek a recovery in this action.
This being so, the Appellants were not the agrieved
parties and consequently could not maintain an action
for their on failure to perform. The rule enunciated in
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the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 1948, Supplemental, Section 318, as set forth in Appellants' Brief
seems to lend its entire weight to the Respondent's theory
in this action.
It should be noted that when the Respondent invited
Appellants' attention to the title defects as disclosed by
an examination of the abstract, the only evidence subsequently furnished plaintiff regarding the marketability
of title was the interim binder of title insurance
·(Exhibit 3) and conearrent with the delivery thereof,
Appellants demanded that Respondent execute a previously prepared Uniform Real Estate Contract and pay
the sum of $4,000.00 to them, and at no time did they
admit that the title was unmarketable or indicate tliat
they had made any arrangements to perfect title to the
property in accordance with the Plaintiff's desires, (R.
22).

In 55 Am. Jur. 908, Vendor and Purchaser,
Sec 515, it is stated: "As to executory contracts,
it is the general rule that a Vendor in default in
the payment of taxes or the discharge of an encumbrance, under a provi~;ion explicitly obligating him to pay or discharge same, cannot maintain an action at law to recover purchase money
thereafter or simultaneously coming due." Citing
99 :Mont. 583, 44 Pac 2nd 1064, 101 A. L. R. 520.
The testimony adduced at the trial was very vague
and ambiguous as to what damage, if any, had been suHtained by Bintz as a result of the contract failure.
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Manford Shaw testified with respect to the condition
of- the property: ''It wasn't anything a little elbow grease
and time and effort would have not cured and restored
to its original position of manicure.'' (R. 123).
The Appellant Bintz testified that he had horses
running at large on the premises and that they had full
access to the property (R. 131). Therefore, it is easy
to conclude that if the property had been damaged by
reason of loosing its manicure, the fact that Bintz permitted horses to run at large upon the property could
easily have caused the damages complained of.
Manford Shaw further testified:
"Q. Have you sold any property out in that area
during the last year~

A. Yes.
Q. And what did the price seen to be,-and what
did the price seem to be, did the price seem
to be just about the same as it has been for
the past several years~
A. Well, no, better than it was the last several
years. It seems to be about the same as a year
ago, or a few months ago. We are dealing
quite a bit in that area." (R. 122)
The Appellant Bintz further testified that he had
listed the property for sale in the form of 10 estate lots
·ranging in price from $3500.00 to $4950.00 each, (R.132),
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which would appear to quite conclusively establish the
fact that the owner Bintz did not acknowledge any depreciation in the value of this land.
From the foregoing testimony, it app~ars quite clear
that Binb sustained no damages by reason of the contract's failure and in any event, should not recover for
damages occasioned by his own failure to perform the
conditions of the contract.
CONCLUSION

It will be seen from the facts of this case that the
Earnest Money Receipt Agreement required the Vendor
to furnish to the Vendee evidence of marketable title
on or before the final contract of sale. This was not done
and that the only efforts made by the Vendor after the
defects were pointed out to him by the Vendee to correct
the situation was to supply an interim binder of title
insurance containing as exceptions many of the same objections that the Vendee had raised. The Vend or adamantly insisted that the title was marketable not only
at the time of the negotiation of the parties but also up
until the time that this appeal was taken. It was clearly
an attempt on the part of the Vend or to foist upon the
Vendee an unmarketable title. To this action, the Vendee
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strenuously objected, asking for the return of his money
which request was refused 'by the Vend or and which
actions necessitated the bringing of this suit. We clearly
feel that the law enunciated in this case would require
that the Supreme Court sustain the decision of the lower
court and affirm the judgment rendered in favor of the
Respondent herein.
Respectfully submitted,

BRANT H. WALL
JOHN E. STONE
Attorneys for Respondent,
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